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The 1992 and 1993 crises in the European Monetary System redirected atten-
tion toward proposals for regulating the foreign exchange market. Academics
(including two authors of this paper) argued for a Tobin tax on foreign ex-
change transactions or the imposition of non-interest-bearing deposit require-
ments on banks with open positions in foreign exchange as a way of smoothing
the transition to European monetary union (EMU) (see Eichengreen and
Wyplosz 1993). European Commission President Jacques Delors mooted the
idea of reimposing capital controls. The Monetary Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament called
on the European Commission to submit detailed proposals for regulating for-
eign exchange transactions (European Parliament 1993). Others (Goldstein et
al. 1993; Mussa and Goldstein 1994) voiced skepticism about the desirability
and effectiveness of such measures.
This controversy rekindled interest in the role played by capital controls in
the operation of pegged exchange rate systems. Some authors (e.g., Wyplosz
1986; Giovannini 1989) have argued that controls played an important role in
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virtually all systems of pegged exchange rates since World War II. In this view,
controls reconciled a modicum of policy autonomy with the commitment to
pegged exchange rates, provided the authorities breathing space to organize
orderly realignments, and made it easier to rebuff speculative attacks not
grounded in fundamentals. Others (e.g., Gros 1987; Gros and Thygesen 1992;
Truman 1994) have argued that capital controls were always easy to evade and
never played a major role in limiting exchange rate flexibility.
In this paper, we seek to advance this debate. Using data for twenty-two
countries over twenty-five years, we show that capital controls have been asso-
ciated with significant differences in the behavior of such macroeconomic vari-
ables as budget deficits and money growth rates. This supports the view that,
historically, controls have made a difference.
This evidence provides the point of departure for the second half of the pa-
per, where we argue the case for measures, specifically non-interest-bearing
deposit requirements on lending to nonresidents, that mimic some of the
effects of capital controls as a way of easing the transition to EMU. Our
focus here is on temporary measures and on Europe rather than on the case
for regulating foreign exchange transactions in general. It is motivated by the
problem of how to complete the transition to EMU. We take this objective as
given and ask whether non-interest-bearing deposit requirements are needed
to achieve it.
The argument for deposit requirements runs as follows. The Maastricht
Treaty on European Union and the Single European Act to which it is a succes-
sor mandate the removal of capital controls by EU (European Union) countries
and their maintenance of exchange rate stability for an extended period as pre-
requisites for participating in EMU. The removal of controls and the extended
period of exchange rate stability may be incompatible, however, for the ab-
sence of controls increases the cost borne by monetary authorities seeking to
defend themselves against speculative attacks of the sort that buffeted the EMS
(European Monetary System) in 1992-93.' It is therefore necessary to alleviate
this predicament. We provide evidence on the channels through which specu-
lative pressures are transmitted and therefore on the appropriate nexus for
intervention. We discuss political constraints associated with the treaty and
suggest that they provide a justification for the selective use of deposit re-
quirements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 9.1, we present
evidence on the effects of controls. Section 9.2 discusses the transmission of
speculative pressure and the feasibility of alleviating it through the imposition
of non-interest-bearing deposit requirements on bank lending to nonresidents.
Section 9.3 draws out the implications for the Maastricht Treaty and the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Section 9.4 is a brief conclusion.
1. Our discussion builds on recent theoretical contributions to the literature on speculative at-
tacks such as Ozkan and Sutherland (1994) and Obstfeld (1994).305 A Safe Passage to EMU?
9.1 Historical Evidence on the Operation of Capital Controls
In this section, we compare the behavior of macroeconomic variables during
periods of tranquillity and speculative pressure. We ask whether there are dif-
ferences in the behavior of such variables when capital controls are in place. A
negative answer is consistent with the view that controls are an ineffectual
policy instrument. Evidence that the behavior of macroeconomic variables dif-
fers significantly when controls are present does not establish that controls are
responsible for those differences, of course; a government might prefer both
controls and certain macroeconomic polices even if the two are causally unre-
lated. But a finding of differences in the stance of macroeconomic variables
is at least consistent with the view that capital controls are a policy tool of
economic significance.
To analyze the behavior of economic variables around the time of specula-
tive attacks, it is necessary to have a selection criterion for attacks that does
not bias one toward finding certain patterns in the data. Large exchange rate
changes are not the same thing as speculative attacks on pegged rates. For one
thing, not all attacks succeed. In addition, large month-to-month changes in
exchange rates are sometimes observed when rates are floating freely and it is
impossible to launch an attack on official reserves because the authorities are
not intervening. When exchange rates are pegged, attacks can be rebuffed by
raising interest rates (relative to those prevailing abroad) and/or by committing
international reserves. Examining only successful attacks might bias one to-
ward a particular characterization of why attacks occur. In particular, consider-
ing only attacks that succeed is likely to lead one to conclude that controls
are ineffective.
An alternative is to construct an index of speculative pressure composed
of a combination of exchange rate changes, reserve changes, and interest rate
changes, as we did in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994).
2 Changes in
exchange rates will be observed when the authorities are unwilling or unable
to resist pressure to realign. (We consider only countries and periods when
currencies were pegged under the provisions of explicit bands such as the Bret-
ton Woods system, the Snake, and the EMS.) Increases in interest rates and
declines in reserves will be observed when the authorities seek to defend the
exchange rate against attack.
We weight the three components of our index so that their conditional vola-
tilities are equal.
3 We construct this measure using monthly data for the OECD
2. The present discussion of data and methodology is much abbreviated; interested readers are
referred to this previous paper.
3. In our earlier paper, we conducted sensitivity analysis to gauge how much difference different
weighting schemes made. Theory can be used to pin down the weights only if one adopts an
empirical model of the connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate.
The professional consensus is, however, that none of the existing models performs adequately for
empirical work (see Meese and Rogoff 1983).306 Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz
countries and selected other economies drawn from the CD-ROM version of
International Financial Statistics. We supplement this with information on
capital controls from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (volumes from 1967 through 1992).
4
We take Germany as the reference country, computing changes in exchange
rates, interest rates, international reserves, etc., relative to their German values.
We specify a threshold for the index of speculative pressure (typically two
standard deviations from the sample mean) and categorize as attacks all
months in which its value exceeds that threshold. To avoid treating successive
months when a currency came under attack as separate episodes, we define an
exclusion window (typically plus or minus six months) and disregard crises
other than the first that fall within the window. As a control group of noncrises
against which our crises can be compared, we take all other nonoverlapping
periods that are left once the episodes of speculative attack are removed.
5
These data have a number of limitations. First, published series on interna-
tional reserves are imperfect. Central banks sometimes report only the gross
foreign assets of the monetary authorities. Since a standard procedure is to
arrange for standby credits in foreign currency, this is a potentially serious
problem. When the authorities intervene, they draw on their credit lines with-
out having to sell reported foreign assets. Even countries that provide data on
foreign liabilities omit a number of operations that are typically undertaken
during periods of speculative pressure, such as off-balance-sheet transactions
like swaps and forward market intervention.
6
Moreover, intervention by foreign central banks may be hard to detect. Be-
cause we analyze changes in the reserves of each country relative to changes
in German reserves, we will pick up intervention by the Bundesbank in support
of foreign currencies. Intervention by third countries will not be detected, how-
ever. Insofar as Germany has been the strong-currency country on which the
bulk of foreign intervention obligations have fallen (especially within the
EMS), this will not be a serious problem. But, even in the EMS, intervention
has been undertaken by third countries (e.g., by the Netherlands), which we
will not capture.
Moreover, monthly data may not be of a sufficiently fine periodicity to iden-
tify every attack (especially unsuccessful ones). Pressure against pegged cur-
rencies can mount quickly and be repelled within the month through interest
rate increases or foreign exchange market intervention. If an attack is launched
4. Our countries were chosen on the basis of data availability and include the United States, the
United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Australia, South
Africa, India, and South Korea.
5. In our earlier paper, we conducted sensitivity analysis varying the width of the exclusion
window as well as the two-standard-deviation threshold for identifying crises.
6. Only comprehensive data on exchange market intervention, which is currently made available
on a limited basis by only a few central banks, would solve this problem.307 A Safe Passage to EMU?
and repelled in a matter of days, the average behavior of interest rates and
international reserves over the month may not reveal its intensity.
Finally, the available measures of controls provide only blunt indicators of
their prevalence. Here we use the IMF's binary indicator of the presence of
restrictions on capital transactions.
7 This crude measure provides minimal in-
formation about the intensity of controls. Given the scope for measurement
error, we would not be surprised if the variable had little explanatory power;
correspondingly, we take seriously any positive results.
The list of speculative crises that results from the application of this method-
ology to data for post-1966 exchange rate pegs in the twenty-two countries is
discussed in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994). It includes prominent
devaluations and realignments of OECD currencies but also a number of epi-
sodes in which interest rates were increased significantly and/or international
reserves were run down.
We start by considering the distributions of macroeconomic variables. We
first examine crises and ask whether the behavior of these variables when there
were capital controls in place differs significantly from their behavior in the
absence of controls. Given the limited sample size, we provide two nonpara-
metric tests of the equality of distributions: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
which considers the entire distribution, and the Kruskal-Wallis test, which fo-
cuses on the median. We provide a Mest for the equality of the sample means
in the presence and absence of controls. We then compute identical test statis-
tics for periods of tranquility (i.e., noncrises). Finally, we provide an analogous
set of statistics for actual realignments and changes in exchange rate regime,
which we dub events to distinguish them from crises.
Table 9.1 reports the basic results. The left-most panel considers attacks
("crises"), while the right-most panel refers to tranquil periods ("noncrises").
Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, we cannot reject except at the 26
percent confidence level the null that the distribution of fiscal ratios (the ratio
of the budget balance to GDP) is identical for crises that took place in the
presence and absence of capital controls. The same is true for the level of
the real exchange rate, for the level of the interest rate differential, and for the
differential rate of growth of foreign exchange reserves. On the other hand, we
can reject the null that the inflation differential, the smoothed trade balance
(the ratio of exports over imports), domestic credit, and money growth are
distributed equally for crises that took place in the presence and absence of
capital controls.
8
Parametric tests reject the null of equal means for inflation, the trade bal-
ance, and money growth. The differential rate of money growth was 1.9 per-
cent (annualized) for speculative crises with controls in place and -6.6 percent
7. The absence of Euromarket data for most of the sample means that offshore-onshore interest
rate differentials, another potential indicator of controls, are unavailable to us.



































































Note: "K-S" denotes probability of rejection of null hypothesis (of equality of distribution across
controls and absence of controls), using the nonparametric Kolomogorov-Smirnov test; a low
value is inconsistent with the null hypothesis. "K-W" denotes probability of rejection of null hy-
pothesis (of equality of distribution across controls and absence of controls), using the nonpara-
metric Kruskal-Wallis test, "t" denotes a r-test of the null hypothesis of equality of first-moments
across controls and absence of controls; a positive number indicates that the sample mean in the
absence of capital controls is higher than the sample mean in the presence of capital controls.
Throughout, a six-month exclusion window and a two-standard-deviation event delimiter are used.
for crises where controls were absent. Similarly, the rate of growth of domestic
credit (relative to Germany) was faster and trade deficits larger when controls
were in place, while inflation rates were higher and more variable.
The role of capital controls is more striking still when we consider the non-
crisis observations in the right-hand panel of table 9.1. We are able to reject
the null of equal distributions and equal means for each variable except re-
serves and possibly budget deficits. Rates of growth of money and credit are
faster, real overvaluation is greater, and budget and trade deficits are larger for
countries not experiencing speculative attacks but with capital controls in
place.
This evidence is consistent with the view that controls made a difference.
Countries with controls in place followed more expansionary monetary poli-
cies, as manifest in faster growth of money and credit and higher rates of infla-
tion. One might expect to see the strongest evidence of the effectiveness of
controls in the behavior of interest rate differentials and the growth of foreign
exchange reserves, with countries applying controls enjoying lower interest
rates and smaller reserve losses. In fact, interest rates appear to have been
higher rather than lower, which may be explicable in terms of the existence of
a political risk premium in countries with controls in place.
We cannot reject the null that the level of foreign exchange reserves was
unaffected by the presence of controls. This may provide the key to under-
standing how countries utilize the instrument. Controls do not allow countries
that pursue policies inconsistent with a peg to keep their exchange rate un-
changed forever. They do not prevent attacks, nor do they permit countries to309 A Safe Passage to EMU?
Table 9.2 Joint Probabilities of Crises and Capital Controls






















Note: Chi-square test (1) test of independence = 33 (P = .00). Percentages are given in paren-
theses.
avoid reserve losses or interest rate increases when attacks occur.
9 Controls
merely render expansionary monetary policies viable for a longer period by
attenuating the link between crises and exchange rate regime collapse.
1
0
This characterization is corroborated by table 9.2. It reports the percentage
of periods (for crises and noncrises) when controls were in place. It shows that
the incidence of crises was proportionally higher when controls were present.
A chi-square test confirms that this difference is statistically significant.
In table 9.3, we shift our focus from "crises" to "events." "Crises" are identi-
fied by our index of speculative pressure irrespective of whether there has been
a change in the exchange rate. An "event," in contrast, corresponds to a realign-
ment or a change in exchange rate regime.
1
1 The analysis of events in table 9.3
confirms the findings of table 9.1 above, strengthening the case that controls
have a clear effect.
Table 9.4 is an analogue to tables 9.1 and 9.3 above. It too reports a series
of tests of the null hypothesis of equality of distributions of macroeconomic
variables in the presence and absence of controls. But, unlike tables 9.1 and
9.3, which examine crises and events, table 9.4 looks at successful and unsuc-
cessful attacks. A successful attack is a crisis that coincides with an event
(more precisely, with the absence of a nonevent); an unsuccessful attack is a
crisis that is not an event. The impression conveyed by table 9.4 is similar to
that of table 9.1; capital controls are associated with significant differences in
macroeconomic behavior, especially looser monetary policy.
Table 9.5 is analogous to tables 9.1, 9.3, and 9.4 but conditions on the pres-
ence or absence of capital controls rather than testing for differences in distri-
butions. Whereas tables 9.1, 9.3, and 9.4 condition on crises, events, and suc-
9. It would be nice to be able to compare the rate of reserve loss in the presence and absence of
controls. But, since our data are monthly, we cannot differentiate between short and violent attacks
of the kind likely to be associated with free capital mobility and the slower erosion of reserves
that may take place in the presence of controls.
10. This effect of controls is modeled formally by Wyplosz (1986), who emphasizes the distinc-
tion between supporting an unviable exchange rate and lengthening the period between crises.
11. The realignment can be in either direction, and the change in regime can be associated with



































































Note: "K-S" denotes probability of rejection of null hypothesis (of equality of distribution across
controls and absence of controls), using the nonparametric Kolomogorov-Smirnov test; a low
value is inconsistent with the null hypothesis. "K-W" denotes probability of rejection of null hy-
pothesis (of equality of distribution across controls and absence of controls), using the nonpara-
metric Kruskal-Wallis test, "t" denotes a f-test of the null hypothesis of equality of first-moments
across controls (events) and absence of controls (nonevents); a positive number indicates that the
sample mean in the absence of capital controls is higher than the sample mean in the presence of




































































Note: "K-S" denotes probability of rejection of null hypothesis (of equality of distribution across
controls and absence of controls), using the nonparametric Kolomogorov-Smirnov test; a low
value is inconsistent with the null hypothesis. "K-W" denotes probability of rejection of null hy-
pothesis (of equality of distribution across controls and absence of controls), using the nonpara-
metric Kruskal-Wallis test, "f" denotes a f-test of the null hypothesis of equality of first-moments
across controls and absence of controls; a positive number indicates that the sample mean in the
absence of capital controls is higher than the sample mean in the presence of capital controls.
cessful attacks, table 9.5 conditions on the presence or absence of controls. It
tests null hypotheses such as, "Successful attacks are different from unsuccess-
ful attacks in the presence of controls." Controls again appear to make a differ-
ence in the sense that their presence is associated with statistically significant
differences in the distributions of a number of macroeconomic variables. By
comparison, differences in macroeconomic behavior are more unusual in the
absence of controls.311 A Safe Passage to EMU?




















































































































































































Note: "K-S" denotes probability of rejection of null hypothesis (of equality of distribution across,
e.g., successful and unsuccessful attacks), using the nonparametric Kolomogorov-Smirnov test; a
low value is inconsistent with the null hypothesis. "K-W" denotes probability of rejection of null
hypothesis of equality of distribution using the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test, "t" denotes a t
test of the null hypothesis of equality of first-moments across, e.g., successful and unsuccessful
attacks; a positive number indicates that the sample mean in the case of an unsuccessful attack is
higher than the sample mean in the presence of a successful attack.
This body of evidence, taken together, is difficult to reconcile with the view
that capital controls were ineffectual—that they were too easily evaded to pro-
vide authorities with significant policy autonomy in periods when exchange
rates were pegged.
9.2 The Mechanics of Speculative Attacks
In the last section, we reported evidence that capital controls make a differ-
ence. Here, we examine the channels of speculative activity in more detail in
order to identify forms of intervention that are most likely to be effective in
influencing the development of speculative attacks.312 Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz
9.2.1 An Illustration
The mechanics of currency speculation are described in Goldstein et al.
(1993). Most transactions take the form of forward contracts—swaps and op-
tions, for example—rather than spot purchases and sales. As soon as one
moves beyond partial equilibrium, however, it becomes obvious that virtually
all such transactions involve the spot sale of the currency under attack coupled
with borrowing in that currency.
Consider an attack against the French franc. A firm or fund manager con-
tracts with bank A to sell the franc against the deutsche mark forward. This
transaction is shown in the balance sheet in table 9.6 for a forward rate of three
francs/deutsche mark. Bank A now has a long open position in francs that it
typically does not wish to take. It therefore sells forward to another bank (bank
B) the francs it purchased from its customer, at the same time buying forward
the deutsche marks it is obliged to deliver. While bank A is now hedged, bank
B is in the same position as bank A at the previous step.
1
2 Bank B will now
attempt to cover its position by undertaking a similar transaction with another
bank.
There may be a series of such transactions. But the bank at the end of the
chain (bank B, to keep matters simple) will still have to sell francs spot against
deutsche marks. Since bank B must find the francs that it will sell spot, it must
borrow them. (Typically, bank B will simultaneously borrow the francs and
lend deutsche marks for one month to cover the maturity mismatch, but this is
not essential to the argument.) As shown in table 9.6, bank B is hedged; it now
holds in its portfolio the deutsche marks that it has contracted to sell to bank
A and owes the francs that it is committed to buy.
In this example, it makes no difference whether traders deal in derivatives
and whether they are residents or nonresidents, aside from the fact that deriva-
tives can be off balance sheet. Imagine that Monsieur Dupont, a French fund
manager, buys on 15 June from his bank a Fr 100,000 European put option on
the franc, to mature on September 1st. He can now sell francs and receive
dollars. The bank selling this option is in the same position as bank A in the
preceding example; it is committed to buying francs (normally against dollars)
on September 1st. Hedging will therefore take the same form as before, with
the bank borrowing Fr 100,000. Similarly, a swap is a combination of a spot
and reverse forward transaction; Monsieur Dupont sells francs spot and buys
them forward. His bank in effect lends him francs during that period and earns
the rate of interest implicit in the forward discount.
For present purposes, then, currency speculation can be described as being
composed of the following elements. An agent takes an open position, usually
against a bank. That position will have associated with it a spot sale of the
12. Bank A still faces the risk that its customer or bank B will not fulfill its contractual obliga-
















































currency under attack, forcing the central bank defending its currency peg to
draw down its reserves. While the chain of subsequent transactions may in-
volve different agents and financial instruments, it necessarily entails a loan of
domestic currency originating in the home country. There are two places where
currency can be obtained: from the banking system of the country in question
(including its central bank) and from domestic-currency-denominated assets
held abroad.
This becomes apparent when it is acknowledged that any speculative attack
necessarily entails the following transactions. Speculators first obtain from
banks the currency that is to be sold on the spot market. Banks then borrow
that currency on the money market. The only agent buying the currency in
such periods is the central bank, which, in so doing, drains liquidity from the314 Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz
Table 9.7 Bank Lending and Reserve Movements
France, May-August 1992
France, September-October 1992
United Kingdom, July-September 1992








Note: "Net Bank Position" refers to foreign lending of domestic currency by domestic banks dur-
ing period of speculative attacks (IFS line 11—16c). "Foreign Exchange Losses" refers to changes
in net changes in foreign asset position of exchange reserves for commercial banks (sources: for
France, changes in net position refers to short-term assets/liabilities and is from Banque de France,
Bulletin Trimestriel, various issues; for the United Kingdom, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulle-
tin). All figures are in U.S. $billion.
market.
1
3 If, to prevent interest rates from rising to politically unsupportable
levels, the central bank sterilizes its exchange market operations and lends the
domestic currency, it fuels additional speculation.
Consolidating these transactions (canceling, among other items, interbank
loans) reveals that what is left is domestic currency lending by the banking
system to the rest of the world. The central bank lends on domestic markets to
resident commercial banks, which lend to nonresidents.
9.2.2 Evidence
The importance of these transactions during periods of speculative activity
is documented by table 9.7, which presents data for France and the United
Kingdom during the 1992 ERM crisis. It is apparent that the net asset position
in francs of French commercial banks increased by amounts broadly compar-
able to the reported foreign exchange losses of the Bank of France.
1
4
The role of banks as key players in periods of speculative crisis can be fur-
ther documented by tracing the evolution of their portfolios. As episodes of
speculative pressure, we again use the "crises" identified above. Figure 9.1
presents histograms depicting gross and net bank lending to nonresidents, dis-
tinguishing banks from nonbanks and gross from net lending.
1
5 We compare
the rate of change of assets and liabilities during "crisis" and "noncrisis" peri-
13. The central bank may refuse to buy its currency spot. In that case, the exchange rate will
depreciate, and the attack will succeed. Alternatively, the central bank may limit its loans to the
banking system, and the interest rate will rise. This, the standard defense against a speculative
attack, proved to be problematic during the EMS crises of 1992 and 1993, for reasons explored in
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Bensaid and Jeanne (1994).
14. For reasons discussed earlier, we know that published data on foreign exchange reserves are
unreliable. We therefore checked fluctuations in reported reserves against the intervention data
reported by Alogoskofous (1993). At $46 billion from July to August 1992 and $228 billion from
September to October 1992, these tell a consistent story.
15. These data come from the IMF and are open to the same limitations as those concerning
central bank reserves (see above). Banks' assets are line 7a.d, their liabilities line 7b.d. We calcu-
late net assets as line 7a.d minus line 7b.d. Assets vis-a-vis nonresident nonbanks are line 7ad.d,
liabilities line 7bd.d. We calculate assets vis-a-vis nonresident banks as 7ad.d minus line 7bd.d,



























































































































































































































































































































Note: "K-S" denotes probability of rejection of null hypothesis (of equality of distribution across
crises and noncrises) using the nonparametric Kolomogorov-Smirnov test; a low value is inconsis-
tent with the null hypothesis. "K-W" denotes probability of rejection of null hypothesis using the
nonparametric test, "t" denotes a Mest of the null hypothesis of equality of first-moments across
crises and noncrises; a positive number indicates that the sample mean in the absence of crises is
higher than the sample mean during crises.
ods. In the upper-left-hand corner, for example, we present the distribution of
growth rates of gross bank assets during tranquil periods and directly below
during speculative attacks. Variability appears to be higher during attacks.
Analogous differences are evident in the behavior of net assets but not gross
liabilities. This is consistent with the view that banks are engaged in domestic-
currency lending to nonresidents during periods of speculative attack since,
when we distinguish the position vis-a-vis nonresident banks and nonbanks,
we see that the higher variability is attributable entirely to the gross asset posi-
tions of domestic banks vis-a-vis nonresident banks.
1
6
Table 9.8 provides Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Kruskal-Wallis, and Mests of the
null that the variables depicted in figure 9.1 are identically distributed during
crises and noncrises. The results indicate that total and net assets and liabilities
have significantly different distributions during crises and noncrises. This is
not true, however, of either bank or nonbank assets (or bank liabilities) sepa-
rately.
Figure 9.2 provides additional evidence for Spain and France during the
1992-93 EMS crises. The thick line shows the foreign exchange losses of the
Bank of Spain. The various speculative episodes are evident, as is the reflux of
reserves following each realignment. The thin line depicts foreign lending by
banks—the increase in their net asset position vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
It shows that reserve losses have as a counterpart commercial bank transac-
tions. The figure for France presents Bank of France data that separate out
bank loans according to their currency of denomination (francs vs. others). The
comovement of commercial bank net lending in francs and foreign exchange
reserve losses is unmistakable.
16. The IMF data do not discriminate between loans in domestic and foreign currencies. The
preceding analysis of bank activities during attacks suggests that the surge of activity documented
by the histograms is most likely to correspond to domestic currency loans.319 A Safe Passage to EMU?
Table 9.9 Pension Funds' International Investments





































Source: Pension Fund Indicators, UBS Asset Management, London, April 1994.
We conclude that bank lending is a major channel through which currency
traders obtain the assets that they sell during speculative attacks. It might be
objected that there exists another source of these holdings, namely, those of
nonbank agents, including households and firms. But households and firms
require much of the money they hold for transactions purposes and lack the
specialized knowledge of professional currency traders. The available data do
not indicate much change in the money holdings of households and firms
around the time of speculative attacks.
What can be sold quickly, in principle, are the assets of pension funds and
other institutional investors. It is difficult to ascertain the amounts held in dif-
ferent currencies by these entities. Table 9.9 provides the total value of nonlo-
cal assets held by these funds. This $220 billion total is probably held mostly
in U.S. dollars and German marks. Assume that 10 percent is held in French
francs. If pension funds were to liquidate all their franc-denominated assets,
this would represent sales of $22 billion. While this is a large amount, the
assets of pension funds, once liquidated, cannot play a further role in specula-
tive dynamics. Lending in domestic currency by banks, in contrast, can con-
tinue indefinitely so long as the central bank sterilizes its foreign exchange
intervention. This is the distinction between an unlimited source of speculative
capital and a one-time sale of assets.
9.3 Alleviating Speculative Pressure during the Transition to EMU
In earlier work, we argued that macroeconomic convergence was not a suf-
ficient condition to preclude speculative crises affecting EMS currencies be-
cause of the possibility of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. Here, we have
provided evidence consistent with the notion that capital controls are important
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the channels that must be affected in order to contain speculative pressure.
This section brings these elements together and draws out their policy implica-
tions. It analyzes the feasibility of restrictions on domestic-currency lending
to nonresidents as a device for containing speculative pressure in the final
stages of the transition to EMU.
9.3.1 The Problem of Self-Fulfilling Attacks
The Maastricht Treaty specifies conditions under which a country will qual-
ify for participation in Europe's monetary union. One is that its exchange rate
must remain within the "normal" ERM bands without being devalued for at
least two years prior to entry. This means that, during the last two years of the
transition, a balance-of-payments crisis that forces a country to devalue or to
suspend its membership in the ERM effectively precludes its participation in
EMU.
To these worries, officials respond that countries need only adopt policies
of convergence sufficient to ensure that their exchange rates are held within
the normal ERM bands for the requisite period. The problem is that a commit-
ment to policies of convergence and policy harmonization may not suffice to
hold the exchange rate stable. This will be the case when there exists scope for
self-fulfilling speculative attacks of the sort analyzed by Flood and Garber
(1984) and Obstfeld (1986). In their models, even countries that are fully com-
mitted to exchange rate stability and have pursued policies consistent with the
maintenance of stable rates may fall prey to speculative crises.
1
7
In theory, a central bank can discourage banks from lending to domestic or
foreign residents by using the traditional instruments of monetary policy. It can
limit the supply of loans relative to demand if it is willing to allow interest
rates to rise. But, given the large capital gains available in short order in the
event of a realignment, it may be necessary to allow interest rates to rise to
very high levels, as illustrated by the case of Sweden in October-November
1992 and by Greece in May 1994. This may prove politically unsupportable
and render a speculative attack self-fulfilling. The interest rate defense will
therefore fail because the markets know that it is too costly to maintain.
Consider a country willing to endure high interest rates and other forms of
austerity now in return for qualifying for EMU later. Its past and current poli-
cies may be entirely consistent with the maintenance of exchange rate stability.
If a speculative attack occurs, however, it will be forced to raise interest rates.
The costs of austerity now rise relative to the benefits of EMU membership
later, which may lead the government to conclude that the cost of qualifying
for EMU is suddenly too high. Once it forsakes the lure of EMU membership,
17. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993), Obstfeld (1994), and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz
(1994) suggest that evidence from recent ERM crises is not inconsistent with the predictions of
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it has no reason to resist shifting policy in a less austere direction; and the
markets, aware of its incentives, have reason to attack.
Note that the shift in policy in a more expansionary direction is contingent;
there is no reason for it to occur in the absence of the attack. In this setting, in
other words, speculative attacks can be rational and self-fulfilling. Eichengreen
and Wyplosz (1993) show that there is some evidence of these dynamics in
1992-93.
The implication is that the Treaty of Maastricht may fail even if countries
intend to follow macroeconomic policies fully consistent with its letter and
spirit. The question, to which we now turn, is whether it might be possible to
reduce the odds of this happening by throwing sand in the wheels of interna-
tional finance.
9.3.2 A Proposal
The analysis of section 9.2 can be summarized by the observation that spec-
ulative attacks start with the opening of a position and end with a loan denomi-
nated in the currency under attack. Discouraging position taking might appear
to be a promising approach to dealing with the problems that result. But posi-
tions can be booked anywhere in the world so long as domestic currency trans-
fers are possible at low cost. If France were to impose a tax on foreign ex-
change transactions in Paris, for example, it would be easy to shift francs to
London and carry out the same transactions there.
A solution is to make use of the fact that all speculative sales must be
matched by fresh provision of the currency under attack. Except for francs
made available by the liquidation of existing offshore asset positions, which
are by definition of limited size, the rest comes from new lending by French
financial institutions—hence the idea to impose an explicit or implicit tax on
domestic-currency lending to nonresidents.
The interest rate defense discourages speculation by making it expensive.
This can equally be done by imposing a deposit requirement on domestic loans
to nonresidents in domestic currency. The deposit could be proportional to the
loan and would have to be maintained interest free at the central bank for the
duration of the loan or for a fixed period. While the cost, in the first instance,
is borne by the lending bank, part of it will be passed along to potential
borrowers.
A useful feature of this measure is that the opportunity cost of the non-
interest-bearing deposit increases with the interest rate, which will rise during
periods of speculative pressure. The interest rate defense will now be more
powerful since it will not only increase the traditional interest parity threshold
(at which the expected devaluation matches the interest differential) but also
impose a cost on position taking.
This proposal is open to obvious criticisms. For one, any disruption to the
free flow of capital has allocative and distributional costs. In the present case,322 Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose, and Charles Wyplosz
however, these are likely to be small because long-term capital flows will be
little affected. While lending to nonresidents will become more expensive, the
additional cost, when spread over a long maturity, will be limited.
1
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Non-interest-bearing-deposit requirements on bank lending to nonresidents
are equivalent to an implicit widening of the exchange rate band. To illustrate,
assume that the lower end of the French franc/deutsche mark band is at a rate
of one (one hundred French francs per one hundred deutsche marks).
1
9 But, if
the cost of the non-interest bearing deposit requirement passed along to the
customer is ten francs per deutsche mark, this shifts the lower edge of the band
to ninety. If the cost of the non-interest-bearing deposit is the equivalent of
widening the band, why then not simply widen the band and avoid interfering
with the operation of capital markets?
The answer is that, by altering the incentives for the authorities to defend
the currency peg, non-interest-bearing deposit requirements increase the ex-
change rate stabilizing effect featured in models of exchange rate target zones.
Because deposit requirements introduce a wedge between on- and offshore
rates, they reduce the cost to the authorities of using the interest rate to defend
the peg. The knowledge that the authorities are more likely to defend the edge
of the band reduces the incentive for speculators to test it.
One might object that a policy that discriminates against loans to nonresi-
dents runs counter to Article 73f of the Maastricht Treaty. Foreigners could
protest an implicit tax not also levied on domestic borrowers. There is ambigu-
ity about the proper interpretation of Article 73f, however, since the treaty
allows temporary measures in case of emergency.
2
0 Nevertheless, the best re-
sponse would be explicitly to authorize such a measure during the remainder
of Stage II. The treaty provides for an Intergovernmental Conference in 1996
to modify provisions that have proved undesirable. The IGC could provide the
amendments required for the temporary establishment of deposit requirements
when and where needed to protect the ERM and therefore ensure that the goals
of the Maastricht process are achieved.
Then there is the question of coverage. Could the measure be rendered inef-
fective by the diversion of domestic-currency loans to channels not covered by
the deposit requirement? Recent Spanish experience illustrates the danger.
2
1
Between September and November 1992, the Bank of Spain imposed a mea-
sure similar to the one contemplated here. It applied a deposit requirement on
new lending by banks to nonresidents through swaps. Swaps are the normal
vehicle for short-term speculative lending; exempting lending for other pur-
18. For example, the cost of a ten-year loan will be increased by a tenth assuming that the
interest rate is constant and the yield curve flat.
19. The example that follows is drawn from Garber and Taylor (1994).
20. It is unclear whether the treaty in fact rules out a scheme like that proposed here. Absent an
amendment to the treaty that addressed this issue head on, the question of Maastricht compatibility
would have to be adjudicated in the European Court of Law.
21. For a description, see Linde (1993) and Linde and Alonso (1993).323 A Safe Passage to EMU?
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Fig. 9.3 Spain: internal and external swap (one-day) interest rates,
October-November 1993
Source: Linde (1993).
poses was meant to shield nonspeculative activity. The measure succeeded in
discouraging speculation for a few days but then lost its effectiveness. Figure
9.3 shows the differential between domestic and off-shore interest rates on
swaps in pesetas during this period. Within a week of the imposition of the
deposit requirement, the differential fell to less than one hundred basis points,
too small to deter speculation given the magnitude of the depreciation that was
anticipated. Conversations with regulators and traders in Madrid and London
have convinced us that there never was a scarcity of pesetas because Spanish
banks sent pesetas to their London subsidiaries to circumvent the deposit re-
quirement (see Freitas de Oliveira 1994).
Thus, limiting the measure to lending to finance transactions in one instru-
ment, even if the latter is the most widely used under normal circumstances,
will prove futile since currency traders will shift to other instruments in re-
sponse to the policy. Accordingly, deposit requirements must be applied to all
domestic-currency loans to all nonresidents.
Finally, there is the question of avoidance. Even if the measure applies to
all bank lending to nonresidents, new nonbank mechanisms for channeling
domestic currency offshore may be established in response to the imposition
of a deposit requirement on lending to nonresidents. A French bank required
to make non-interest-bearing deposits when lending francs to nonresidents
could lend francs to French corporations, which in turn could lend them to
nonresidents (including their own nonresident operations or nonresident
branches of the initiating French bank). This raises the possibility that a
scheme that started out as a deposit requirement on loans to nonresidents
would be broadened into a deposit requirement on all loans extended through
certain windows and, if lending was diverted to other windows, on all bank
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The extent of evasion is likely to depend on the length of the period for
which the deposit requirement remains in effect. If that period is short, it may
not pay to set up the back channels required for evasion. Firms may be unwill-
ing to incur the costs of avoidance if the benefits are transitory; as Dixit (1991)
has shown, even relatively small fixed costs can have potentially large effects
on real and financial behavior. Hence, non-interest-bearing deposit require-
ments are most likely to be effective if their imposition is limited to the last
two years of the transition to EMU.
Clearly, no measure of the sort we describe here is ever 100 percent effec-
tive. It is important to note, however, that to slow down speculative activity
and provide time for orderly realignments it is not necessary for the measure
to be watertight.
2
2 The historical record indicates that capital controls have had
measurable effects on macroeconomic activity even when they were less than
totally effective.
9.4 Conclusion
Retrospective evidence on capital controls in section 9.1 verified that these
measures affected the course of macroeconomic developments, contrary to the
presumption that they were too easily evaded to have a discernible effect. Pro-
spective analysis in section 9.3 suggested that it might be possible to simulate
their effects for a transitional period by imposing non-interest-bearing deposit
requirements on bank lending to nonresidents.
We cannot emphasize too strongly that we conceive of this device as a tem-
porary measure to be applied during the transition to monetary union in Eu-
rope. It is a third-best solution to which one is driven only if first- and second-
best responses are ruled out and the goal of EMU is taken as given. In Europe,
where pegging exchange rates within normal bands for at least two years is a
prerequisite for completing the transition to monetary union, such measures
may be justified by the considerable efficiency advantages of the Single Market
Program, whose political viability appears to hinge in turn on the establish-
ment of a single currency. One of the "convergence criteria" of the Maastricht
Treaty mandates that countries hold their exchange rates within their normal
fluctuation bands for two years without experiencing "exceptional tensions."
Even if this provision is interpreted as allowing countries to realign in response
to speculative pressures not of their own making without being disqualified
from participating in EMU, measures like those described here would be
22. Fieleke (1994) dismisses as ineffectual the capital controls applied by Ireland, Spain, and
Portugal in 1993 on the grounds that "all three countries were obliged to devalue within months
after imposing or intensifying controls." Leaving aside whether these countries' controls were well
designed, this criticism misses the point that these three countries were all able to realign and stay
in the ERM, whereas countries that did not apply controls, like Italy and the United Kingdom,
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needed to provide time for the multilateral consultations that must precede
orderly realignments and to prevent self-fulfilling attacks from driving currenc-
ies out of the ERM.
2
3
Non-interest-bearing deposit requirements on lending to nonresidents are
not the first-best mechanism for completing the transition. The smoothest way
of reaching that goal is to move there directly. Suppose that financial market
participants awoke one Monday to the news that a subset of EU countries had
formed a monetary union over the weekend, that the European Monetary Insti-
tute had been transformed into the European Central Bank, and that the latter
would henceforth be the sole issuer of the participating countries' currencies,
which it stood ready to exchange for one another at par. Transitional problems
would be ruled out by ruling out the transition. In practice, however, this out-
come is unlikely for political reasons. Germany insisted on the three-stage
transition process of the Maastricht Treaty and the convergence criteria embed-
ded in its protocol on monetary union precisely in order to rule out abrupt
action.
The second-best solution is to declare wide bands like those of the post-July
1993 EMS the "normal bands" referred to in the protocol and to move to mone-
tary union after a subset of EU countries have held their currencies within
bands of ± 15 percent for two years. This assumes, of course, that the difficulty
of holding exchange rates within 15 percent bands is qualitatively different
from holding them within 2
lA percent bands. The longer the ERM's new fluc-
tuation bands have gone untested, the more confident European policymakers
have become of this assumption. But there is reason to think that their confi-
dence is unfounded—that an oil shock, a recession, or an electoral surprise
could quickly cause wide bands to bind. Experience with floating exchange
rates in the 1970s and 1980s showed that cumulative bilateral nominal ex-
change rate movements of 15 percent over a period of two years are not un-
common.
The implication is that the Treaty of Maastricht can fail even if countries
adopt macroeconomic policies consistent with its letter and spirit. And these
dangers will certainly intensify in the runup to Stage III. Political brinkman-
ship will grow as the deadline nears, heightening doubts that exchange rates
are really locked.
2
4 The markets will have good reason to anticipate last-minute
realignments motivated by attempts to boost competitiveness before parities
are locked in (Froot and Rogoff 1991). Any of these factors could defeat efforts
to hold ERM currencies within 15 percent bands.
Furthermore, German officials (who insisted on the convergence criteria to
23. It is useful to recall that the EMS has never lost a member as a result of a speculative attack
so long as its weak currency countries were operating under capital controls.
24. For example, the German Constitutional Court has ruled that the final decision to go ahead
with monetary unification belongs to the Bundestag. It is easy to guess how the markets will react
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force their potential EMU partners to demonstrate their willingness to live with
the consequences for macroeconomic policy of monetary union) are unlikely
to regard 15 percent bands as a sufficiently stringent test of policymakers'
resolve.
2
5 One might raise the same objection to the imposition of non-interest-
bearing deposit requirements on bank lending to nonresidents; these measures
are tantamount to an implicit widening of the band in that they relax the exter-
nal constraint on domestic policy. The difference is that non-interest-bearing
deposit requirements bind only in periods of speculative pressure. The rest of
the time, governments will have ample opportunity to demonstrate their com-
mitment to the policies mandated by the Maastricht Treaty.
A final objection to the proposal is that deposit requirements will weaken
monetary discipline. Governments insulated from the discipline imposed by
international financial markets may embark on policies which further destabi-
lize exchange rates. That there exists the potential of moral hazard is clear from
the analogy between our proposal and the standard argument for insurance:
deposit requirements could ensure the EU against policy mistakes that would
otherwise derail Stage II of the Maastricht process. If one thinks that the costs
of failure are high, then an investment in insurance is justified. But, just as any
sensible insurance company should monitor the behavior of its policy holders,
the EU should monitor the behavior of governments receiving "deposit [re-
quirement] insurance." Fortunately, it already has the appropriate mechanisms
in place: the European Monetary Institute and the Monetary Committee, which
are authorized to surveil the policies of EU countries, recommend corrective
action, and levy penalties against governments that fail to comply.
European policymakers will be inclined to shy away from any recommenda-
tion that entails amending the treaty. This "don't open the Pandora's box" men-
tality fails to come to grips with the lack of viability of the current Maastricht
blueprint for completing the transition to monetary union. If, as we argue, an
extended period of exchange rate stability within narrow bands is not feasible,
then some provision of the treaty must be changed for the goal of monetary
union to be achieved. One option is to add further safeguards sufficient for
Germany and other reluctant participants to commence with monetary union
immediately. Another is to accept the wide bands of the post-1993 EMS as the
normal bands referred to in the protocol on monetary union, although gaining
the agreement of these same reluctant countries will again require additional
safeguards. Still another option is to authorize the temporary imposition of
deposit requirements on lending to nonresidents. One way or another, the treaty
will have to be revised.
Of course, one can insist on a policy of "none of the above." But the implica-
tion is that the goal of European monetary unification will never be achieved.
25. The German Constitutional Court has also ruled that the Maastricht Treaty's so-called con-
vergence criteria must be interpreted strictly, which throws into question the realism of this
strategy.327 A Safe Passage to EMU?
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Comment Jose Vinals
This is the latest in a series of very interesting papers written by the authors in
the past few years that have enhanced our understanding of why foreign ex-
change market crises arise and of what can be done to preserve exchange rate
stability. In the paper, the authors make two main points: first, that capital con-
trols are effective in influencing key macroeconomic variables during pro-
longed periods of time; second, that a nonremunerated deposit on bank lending
to nonresidents could mimic the main effects of capital controls and therefore
be a useful tool for preserving EMS stability during the transition to EMU.
In my comments, I will attempt to argue that the evidence presented by the
authors is not as favorable as they claim to the alleged effectiveness or desir-
ability of capital controls. I will also suggest that there are many reasons to
suspect that their "Tobin tax"-type proposal for enhancing the future stability
of the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS is likely to be either inef-
fective or extremely distortionary from an economic viewpoint.
How Effective Are Capital Controls?
Section 9.1 of the paper presents empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
capital controls during periods when currencies were pegged in an explicit
manner. In particular, the observations are drawn from the Bretton Woods sys-
tem, the Snake, and the EMS and correspond to OECD countries.
Instead of performing the traditional tests of covered interest rate differen-
tials or onshore-offshore interest rate differentials to assess the effectiveness of
capital controls, the authors use a more refined methodology, already applied in
an earlier paper (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1994). In particular, they
look at the behavior of certain key macroeconomic variables during both tran-
quil (what they call "noncrises") and turbulent (what they call "crisis") periods
in foreign exchange markets and perform nonparametric tests to assess whether
Jose Vinals is head of economic studies at the Bank of Spain and a research fellow of the Centre
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the behavior of the chosen variables differs significantly depending on whether
there are capital controls.
After examining the empirical evidence, the authors conclude that the be-
havior of a number of macro variables (i.e., inflation, the money stock, the
trade balance, and the real exchange rate) seems to differ with and without
capital controls. They interpret this finding as supportive of the hypothesis that
controls are effective in providing the authorities with some room for policy
autonomy. However, my reading of their evidence is quite different. Indeed, in
the light of the proposal that they make in section 9.1, the key question to ask
is to what extent capital controls increase the capacity of the authorities to
defend the central parity in bouts of turbulence so that they avoid having to
raise interest rates to extremely high levels or deplete so fast the stock of for-
eign reserves. In other words, the key test on the effectiveness of controls
would be to check whether the behavior of interest rates and foreign reserves
differs during turbulent times in cases when controls are in place relative to
cases when they are not.
Consequently, when we go to table 9.1 and look at the behavior of interest
rates and foreign reserves, what do we find? Surprisingly—in view of the opti-
mism of the authors about the effectiveness of controls—what we observe
from looking at the last two rows during turbulent times is that the behavior of
interest rates and foreign reserves is not significantly different with and with-
out capital controls! In particular, both variables are distributed similarly, and
their mean values are not statistically different in both instances.
In sum, I do not find any evidence suggesting that capital controls have pro-
vided for a smoother behavior of interest rates and foreign reserves in times of
strong exchange market pressures. While it is true that the authors find that
controls seem to matter for the evolution of other macroeconomic variables at
such times, this is not what is relevant for answering the key question: Do
controls facilitate the defense of the central parity by the authorities in turbu-
lent times? In my view, their own evidence about the behavior of interest rates
and foreign reserves suggests that the answer should be no.
This does not mean, however, that controls do not matter. In fact, they do,
although in a manner that I would describe as being far from economically
desirable. In particular, if we look again at table 9.1, it is evident that, across
tranquil and turbulent periods alike, capital controls tend to be associated with
both higher inflation and higher trade deficits. In other words, capital controls
and higher domestic and external imbalances go hand in hand as a result of the
pursuit of more expansionary policies. And, while it is not possible to draw
causal implications from observed correlations, my impression is that those
countries that resort to capital controls do so in order to be able to run more
expansionary policies. Finally, since such policies are associated with funda-
mental imbalances, capital controls eventually lead to exchange market turbu-
lence and to unavoidable devaluations.
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view that controls do not avoid the exacerbation of policy dilemmas incurred
by the authorities at times of turbulence when defending the currency, espe-
cially when "self-fulfilling" attacks occur. In addition, over the medium term,
capital controls seem to facilitate the pursuit of inflationary and divergent eco-
nomic policies, which eventually provoke fully justified attacks on currencies,
causing exchange market instability.
In short, capital controls do not seem to facilitate the defense of exchange
rate stability in the short term but contribute to undermine it in the medium
term through the relaxation of policy discipline and coordination.
A Proposal to Save the ERM
The authors believe that, since the ERM is exposed to "self-fulfilling" at-
tacks, policy coordination and convergence are necessary but not sufficient
conditions to preserve exchange rate stability. They also believe that defensive
interest rate increases are not credible or effective and thus that the ERM is
bound to fail unless something else is done. Their proposed solution is to im-
pose a nonremunerated deposit on bank lending to nonresidents in order to
close the main channel through which speculators obtain the weak currency in
turbulent times.
Besides it being highly debatable whether such a proposal is consistent with
the legal provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht, I think that it poses several
important economic and practical problems.
The way in which I understand their "Tobin tax"-type proposal (see Tobin
1978) is by analogy with a tax on alcohol. Let us assume that the government
believes that the consumption of alcohol should be reduced. It would be more
efficient and effective to raise the tax on alcohol rather than to raise all con-
sumption taxes. The logic for their proposal is similar: to defend the currency,
it is preferable to design measures specifically aimed at "taxing" speculators
rather than increasing the general level of interest rates, which penalizes specu-
lators and nonspeculators alike and may be very costly in macroeconomic
terms.
In practice, however, the high degree of integration of national financial mar-
kets and the sophistication of market operators is very likely to render the
Eichengreen-Rose-Wyplosz proposal ineffective very quickly, as the authors
themselves seem to acknowledge. On the one hand, taxing only the loans
granted by domestic banks in domestic currency would immediately provoke
transfers of money to foreign branches, which, in turn, would rechannel the
money to the ultimate borrowers. On the other hand, taxing only the loans
extended by domestic banks to nonresidents would lead to the establishment
of nominal nonbank resident borrowers, which, in turn, would rechannel the
money to nonresident borrowers. Consequently, if one wants the measure to be
effective, one would have to be prepared to close all possible loopholes by—
temporarily—taxing all bank credit on domestic currency.
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it would end up affecting all potential borrowers, thus negatively affecting eco-
nomic activity, and eroding the single market in trade and financial services.
In terms of the above-mentioned alcohol analogy, one would end up taxing
consumption on all goods in order to discourage the consumption of alcohol.
To conclude, while I agree with the authors that there are sources of potential
instability in the ERM given its nature of a "fixed but adjustable" exchange
rate arrangement and that something ought to be done about it, they have failed
to convince me that (a) capital controls have been as effective in the past as
they claim in helping defend exchange rate stability in the shorter-term, (b)
that the medium-term effect of controls is economically desirable or favorable
to exchange rate stability, and (c) that their "Tobin tax"-type proposal will be
either effective or economically desirable as a way of stabilizing the ERM in
future years.
Obviously, there is no easy way out for preserving the stability of the ERM.
Nevertheless, rather than imposing capital controls or other administrative
measures to discourage capital flows, what ought to be done is to strengthen
policy coordination in the monetary and nonmonetary fields so as to keep ex-
change rates broadly in line with fundamentals and to enhance the effective-
ness of the mechanisms for preserving exchange rate cohesion in the ERM in
those cases when it is threatened by speculative attacks. Restricting capital
flows addresses just the symptoms but not the causes of underlying distur-
bances, and there is the serious risk that the presence of such restrictions may
even exacerbate them over the medium term by relaxing policy discipline and
by weakening international policy coordination.
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